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THE ROLE OF THE IAEA IN SHAPING NATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY
REGULATIONS
Sayidkomil Ibodullaev
Lecturer at “Private International Law”
Department of the Tashkent State University of Law
siresearchuz@gmail.com
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.16949742
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has, since its establishment
in 1957, evolved into the central institution guiding the development and
harmonisation of nuclear safety standards worldwide. Its statutory mandate,
enshrined in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(INFCIRC/8/Rev.1), tasks it with promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
while ensuring that such use is consistent with the highest attainable levels of
safety and security. This dual mission—promotion and regulation—has required
the IAEA to develop a unique normative framework that, while not directly
binding in international law, has profoundly shaped national nuclear safety
regimes.
The IAEA’s influence is exerted primarily through its Safety Standards
Series, a comprehensive suite of documents that includes
Safety Fundamentals
,
Safety Requirements
, and
Safety Guides
. The Fundamental Safety Principles
(SF-1), endorsed at the highest political level by IAEA Member States, provide
the overarching safety objectives that national regulators incorporate into their
domestic legislation. Although these principles do not have the status of treaty
obligations, their acceptance is near-universal, and their substantive content is
frequently transposed into binding national regulations. For example, the
European Union’s Council Directive 2014/87/Euratom on nuclear safety
explicitly aligns its provisions with the IAEA Safety Standards, thereby
institutionalising the Agency’s guidance within the EU’s legal order.
The process by which IAEA standards influence national frameworks is
multifaceted. In many emerging nuclear states—such as the United Arab
Emirates, Jordan, and Bangladesh—the drafting of primary nuclear legislation
and regulatory codes has been undertaken with direct technical assistance from
the IAEA under its
Integrated Regulatory Review Service
(IRRS) missions.
These peer review mechanisms provide a structured evaluation of a country’s
regulatory infrastructure against the benchmarks set by the Safety Standards
Series. The recommendations and suggestions issued in IRRS mission reports
often become the blueprint for legislative reform. In the UAE, for instance, the
Federal Law by Decree No. 6 of 2009 Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear
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Energy was crafted with extensive reference to IAEA requirements on licensing,
emergency preparedness, and radiation protection, ensuring compliance from
inception.
The IAEA’s normative impact extends beyond formal legislative drafting.
Through its
Convention on Nuclear Safety
(CNS, 1994), the Agency provides a
legally binding platform for states to commit to the implementation of effective
safety measures. While the CNS does not prescribe technical details, it obliges
contracting parties to establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory
framework consistent with IAEA principles. The peer review mechanism under
the CNS—where national reports are scrutinised in review meetings—has been
a powerful driver of convergence towards IAEA standards, even in jurisdictions
with strong pre-existing regulatory traditions, such as Canada’s Canadian
Nuclear Safety Commission or the United States’ Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
A key legal characteristic of the IAEA’s influence is its
soft law
nature. The
Agency’s safety standards, while non-binding, gain quasi-binding force through
incorporation into national law, international conventions, bilateral agreements,
and vendor–client contracts. In commercial nuclear projects, suppliers often
condition reactor export and service agreements on the recipient country’s
adoption of IAEA-compliant safety legislation. This creates a contractual
pathway by which IAEA norms become de facto mandatory for project
execution. South Korea’s KEPCO, in its contracts for the Barakah Nuclear Power
Plant, required adherence to IAEA Safety Standards not only in design and
construction but also in operational procedures.
In recent years, the IAEA has also intensified its role in integrating
post-
Fukushima safety enhancements
into national frameworks. Following the
Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011, the Agency launched the
Action Plan on
Nuclear Safety
, updating its Safety Requirements to strengthen provisions on
severe accident management, external hazard assessment, and emergency
preparedness. These revisions have been rapidly reflected in domestic
legislation; for example, Japan’s amended Act on the Regulation of Nuclear
Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors and the European
Commission’s amended Nuclear Safety Directive both drew directly on post-
Fukushima IAEA recommendations.
The Agency’s capacity-building initiatives further ensure that its standards
are not merely adopted on paper but are operationally embedded. The
Regulatory Cooperation Forum
(RCF) and
Global Nuclear Safety and
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Security Network
(GNSSN) provide platforms for national regulators to
exchange best practices, receive training, and harmonise approaches, reinforcing
the IAEA’s normative guidance through sustained institutional interaction.
Thus, while the IAEA cannot legislate for sovereign states, its combination
of safety standard-setting, peer review, technical assistance, and convention-
based commitments has produced a robust and enduring legal influence. In
practice, few national nuclear safety regimes today are developed in isolation
from the Agency’s guidance, and the trend towards deeper alignment is set to
continue as new nuclear entrants seek both technical legitimacy and
international confidence.
Case Studies of IAEA’s Influence on National Frameworks
1. United Arab Emirates (UAE)
The UAE’s nuclear programme, initiated in the late 2000s, is one of the
clearest examples of a “greenfield” legal framework built almost entirely on
IAEA guidance. Prior to the enactment of Federal Law by Decree No. 6 of 2009
Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, the UAE had no dedicated
nuclear legislation or regulatory authority. In developing the law, the Emirates
Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) and the newly established Federal
Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) engaged directly with IAEA experts
through Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) missions.
The resulting legislative framework closely mirrors the
IAEA Safety
Standards
in areas such as licensing procedures, siting and design safety
requirements, and obligations for operational safety reviews. For example,
FANR’s Regulation for the Licensing of Nuclear Facilities (FANR-REG-03)
incorporates verbatim language from IAEA Safety of Nuclear Power Plants:
Design (SSR-2/1) regarding defence-in-depth principles. Furthermore, the UAE
embedded a mandatory peer review provision in its regulatory system,
requiring periodic Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions, another
IAEA service.
This alignment with IAEA norms not only expedited the licensing of the
Barakah Nuclear Power Plant but also ensured international confidence in the
UAE’s regulatory capacity, which was critical for securing nuclear fuel supply
contracts from multiple states.
2. Finland
Finland’s nuclear safety framework has long been recognised as among the
most rigorous in the world, yet it remains closely integrated with IAEA safety
principles. The Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) and related decrees incorporate
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high-level requirements that are further detailed in the regulatory guides issued
by STUK, Finland’s Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority. While STUK
develops its own YVL Guides, these documents explicitly reference and
incorporate IAEA Safety Standards, ensuring that Finland’s domestic rules
remain consistent with evolving international norms.
Following the Fukushima accident in 2011, Finland undertook a
comprehensive review of its regulatory framework in parallel with IAEA’s post-
Fukushima Action Plan. STUK amended several YVL Guides—particularly those
relating to severe accident management (YVL B.1, B.3, B.4)—in direct response
to recommendations from IAEA’s Extraordinary Ministerial Conference on
Nuclear Safety and subsequent Safety Requirements revisions. This
demonstrates that even established regulators in advanced nuclear states treat
IAEA outputs as a primary driver for updating safety legislation.
3. South Korea
South Korea’s nuclear safety authority, the Nuclear Safety and Security
Commission (NSSC), maintains a legal framework that integrates IAEA standards
in a systematic way. The Nuclear Safety Act (Act No. 11082 of 2011) and its
implementing decrees incorporate technical requirements based on the IAEA
Safety Standards Series, particularly in areas of reactor design, radiation
protection, and emergency preparedness.
A notable example is the regulatory alignment undertaken during Korea’s
export of APR-1400 reactors to the UAE. The NSSC, in cooperation with KEPCO
and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS), cross-referenced national
regulatory provisions against IAEA Safety Requirements to ensure full
compatibility with the UAE’s IAEA-based regulations. This cross-jurisdictional
harmonisation underscores the IAEA’s function as a
global common
denominator
in nuclear safety law.
4. Post-Fukushima Global Adaptation
Across all jurisdictions, the IAEA’s post-Fukushima initiatives have
catalysed significant legal changes. The 2015 revision of the Safety
Requirements for the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (SSR-2/1)
introduced more stringent provisions on external hazard resilience, severe
accident management, and emergency preparedness. States such as Canada,
Japan, and the UK incorporated these provisions through amendments to their
primary legislation and technical regulations.
For example, the UK’s Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) revised its Safety
Assessment Principles (SAPs) to integrate IAEA recommendations on cliff-edge
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effects and beyond-design-basis accidents, reinforcing their legal weight through
mandatory compliance for licensed operators.
Concluding Analysis and Policy Recommendations
The examination of IAEA’s role in shaping national nuclear safety
regulations demonstrates a consistent pattern: while the Agency’s standards are
not legally binding in the traditional sense, they exert a profound quasi-
legislative influence through a combination of normative guidance, peer review,
and integration into binding instruments such as treaties, national laws, and
commercial contracts. This soft-law framework operates effectively because it is
embedded within a multilayered system of incentives—ranging from the
political legitimacy conferred by IAEA compliance, to the practical necessity of
satisfying vendor and financier requirements in nuclear projects.
Key Analytical Findings
1.Soft Law with Hard Consequences
The IAEA’s safety standards operate as “soft law” but have direct “hard law”
implications once adopted into national frameworks or incorporated into treaty
obligations. This duality allows the IAEA to maintain flexibility while ensuring
consistent safety benchmarks across jurisdictions.
2.Peer Review as a Compliance Driver
Mechanisms such as the
Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
and
Operational Safety Review Team (OSART)
missions provide structured
feedback that states often treat as binding reform agendas. The reputational and
political costs of disregarding these recommendations make them powerful
compliance tools.
3.Post-Accident Normative Acceleration
Following major nuclear accidents—Three Mile Island (1979), Chernobyl
(1986), and Fukushima Daiichi (2011)—the IAEA rapidly updated its standards,
triggering national legal reforms across both emerging and established nuclear
states. This reactive agility reinforces the Agency’s normative authority.
4.Harmonisation Across Borders
In cross-border reactor supply projects, IAEA standards often serve as the
default legal denominator between the exporter’s and importer’s regulations.
This harmonisation effect is particularly visible in Korean reactor exports to the
UAE, and in multinational vendor consortia.
Policy Recommendations
1.Codification through Multilateral Treaties
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To strengthen the binding character of safety standards, elements of the
IAEA’s Safety Requirements could be selectively codified into an optional
protocol to the
Convention on Nuclear Safety
. This would preserve flexibility
while creating a legally binding baseline for all contracting parties.
2.Enhanced Capacity Building for New Entrants
Emerging nuclear states, particularly in Africa and Southeast Asia, often
lack the institutional depth to implement complex IAEA standards. Expanding
technical cooperation programmes, model legislation templates, and sustained
IRRS follow-up missions would address this gap.
3.Linking Financing to IAEA Compliance
International financial institutions (IFIs) and export credit agencies should
require verified compliance with IAEA standards as a condition for nuclear
project financing. This would embed safety compliance into the project’s
economic structure.
4.Digital Integration and Regulatory Technology
The IAEA should explore digital platforms for real-time regulatory
compliance tracking, enabling states to benchmark their national frameworks
against evolving safety standards and peer performance metrics.
5.Stronger Public Transparency Mechanisms
As public trust is integral to nuclear energy governance, national regulators
should be encouraged to publish IRRS and OSART mission findings in full,
alongside detailed implementation roadmaps. This would promote
accountability and reinforce the legitimacy of IAEA-led oversight.
Conclusion
The IAEA’s success in shaping national nuclear safety regulations lies in its
ability to function as both a technical authority and a normative institution. Its
standards, though not binding under international law, have acquired binding
force in practice through incorporation into domestic legal systems and
international contractual arrangements. By balancing flexibility with rigour, and
by coupling normative guidance with peer review and capacity-building, the
IAEA has established a global safety framework that is responsive, harmonised,
and resilient.
Future progress will depend on bridging the gap between non-binding
recommendations and enforceable obligations, especially in new nuclear states.
If strategically enhanced, the IAEA’s role can evolve from a predominantly
advisory div into a central pillar of enforceable global nuclear governance..
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References:
1.
International Atomic Energy Agency, Statute of the IAEA,
INFCIRC/8/Rev.1, 1957.
2.
International Atomic Energy Agency, Fundamental Safety Principles (SF-
1), Vienna: IAEA, 2006.
3.
International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants:
Design (SSR-2/1 Rev. 1), Vienna: IAEA, 2016.
4.
Council
Directive
2014/87/Euratom,
Amending
Directive
2009/71/Euratom Establishing a Community Framework for the Nuclear Safety
of Nuclear Installations, Official Journal of the European Union, L 219/42, 2014.
5.
International Atomic Energy Agency, Integrated Regulatory Review
Service (IRRS): Guidelines for IRRS Missions, Vienna: IAEA, 2020.
6.
UAE Federal Law by Decree No. 6 of 2009 Concerning the Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Energy.
7.
STUK – Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, YVL Guides, Helsinki,
Finland, revised editions 2013–2019.
8.
Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (Republic of Korea), Nuclear
Safety Act, Act No. 11082, 2011.
9.
International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety,
Vienna: IAEA, 2011.
10.
Office for Nuclear Regulation (UK), Safety Assessment Principles for
Nuclear Facilities, 2020 Edition
