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10.37547/tajpslc/Volume07Issue02-04
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CITATIO N
Sardor Rakhimov. (2025). The impact of water factor on security issues
between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The American Journal of Political
Science Law and Criminology, 7(02), 16
–
21.
https://doi.org/10.37547/tajpslc/Volume07Issue02-04
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© 2025 Original content from this work may be used under the terms
of the creative commons attributes 4.0 License.
The impact of water factor
on security issues between
Afghanistan and Pakistan
Sardor Rakhimov
Master's student, Tashkent State University of Oriental Studies,
Uzbekistan
Abstract:
This article examines the importance of the
water factor in the relations between the two countries,
including the impact of the ongoing projects and
planned dams in the Kabul River basin, which flow
through the territories of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The
article also discusses in detail the hydropower potential
of these rivers and their strategic importance for
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Keywords:
Water factor, water security, transboundary
waters, hydropolitics, hydrogeography, Kabul River,
Shahtoot Dam.
Introduction:
The 21st century is considered by many
analysts to be the century of water problems. This is
because the availability of this important resource is
decreasing worldwide due to population growth and
climate change [1]. Indeed, water is not only an
essential component of sustainable development,
socio-economic progress and dynamic ecosystems, but
also a vital need for humanity. It is crucial for human
health, well-being and productivity. Therefore, water
security is a key element of sustainable development.
This means that countries must have sufficient and good
quality water to carry out various productive activities.
Water security enables a state to eliminate poverty and
improve the living standards of its population [2].
Consequently, Ismail Serageldin, former Vice President
of the World Bank, warned in 1995: “If the wars of the
20th century were fought over oil, the wars of the 21st
century will be fought over water”
[3].
According to the UN, 60 percent of the world’s
freshwater flows are transboundary. 153 countries
share part of their territory in at least one of 286
transboundary river and lake basins and 592
transboundary groundwater systems [4]. Of the 153
countries that share transboundary waters, only 43
have practical agreements covering 90 percent or more
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of their shared rivers, lakes, and groundwater.[5] It is
worth noting that Afghanistan is home to four major
river systems: the Amu Darya, the Harirud-Murghab,
the Helmand, and the Kabul Rivers [3]. These rivers
cross international borders and flow into Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan in the north, Iran and
Turkmenistan in the northwest, Iran in the southwest,
and Pakistan in the southeast and east. These rivers
have been the foundation of human development in
Asia for thousands of years. It is of great importance to
study and research the water supply of Afghanistan
and its neighboring countries - Pakistan, Iran,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. This will help
prevent any future conflicts with neighboring countries
over the use of Afghanistan's water resources.[1]
METHODS
A number of scholars have conducted scientific
research on the impact of the
“water factor” on
relations and security issues between states, and the
importance of transboundary rivers, in particular, the
role of the “water factor” in Afghanistan
-Pakistan
relations. In particular, the book “Transboundary
Water Resources in Afghanistan: Implications of
Climate Change and Land Use
[1]”, co
-authored by
John Schroeder and Sher Jan Ahmadzai, of the Center
for Afghan Studies at the University of Nebraska,
served as an important source in covering this topic.
Indeed, this book provides detailed information on the
hydrogeography (water basins and rivers) of
Afghanistan and its neighboring countries, the
groundwater geology of Afghanistan, the development
of water resources in the Kabul River Basin, dams in
Afghanistan, an analysis of Afghanistan's water treaties
and relevant international water legislation, the
hydropolitics of Afghan waters and its future, and the
prospects for water management in Afghanistan:
capacity development, risk assessment, cooperation,
and rational water management.
A collection of articles entitled "Afghanistan-Pakistan
Water Sharing: The State of the Basins"[6] also explores
a number of issues related to the topic. In particular, it
contains the authors' analytical opinions on cooperation
in the basins of rivers crossing the border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, Taslim Malik's
"The Pak-Afghan Water Issue: A Case for Benefit-
Sharing, Policy Perspectives"[3], Sajjad Ali Memon's
"The Kabul River:
Hydropolitics
of
Pakistan-
Afghanistan"[7], Ravichandran Murthy and Sumayya
Bibi's "Water Security and Cross-Border Water
Management in the Kabul River Basin"[2], and Fawad
Ali's "Decades on, Pakistan is still seeking a Kabul River
agreement"[8], elaborate on the impact of the "water
factor" on security issues between Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
RESULTS
Figure 1
River basin crossing the Durand Line
[6]
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Figure 2
The Kabul River Basin and the dams built on it [9]
DISCUSSION
It is known that Afghanistan and Pakistan also share
the waters of a total of 9 rivers, but they have not
signed a single agreement on the joint management
and control of common water resources.[3] In addition
to the historical and political problems between these
countries, modern problems such as population
growth and climate change are also complicating the
situation. Due to climate change, both countries are
facing water shortages, which in turn is increasing
competition for common water resources.[7]
The importance of the Kabul River
The Kabul River is used not only as a source of drinking
water, but also for agriculture, industry and electricity
generation. The Kabul River, which is an important
source of hydropower for both countries, has a large
hydropower potential, but this potential has not yet
been fully exploited. The Afghan government is
currently planning dozens of hydropower projects.
These projects will undoubtedly affect Pakistan's water
rights and traditional uses.[3]
The Kabul River originates mainly from melting glaciers
and snow in the Hindu Kush Mountains. It is later
joined by the Kunar River.[10] Notably, this river is also
known as the Chitral and discharges approximately 8
million acre feet of water into the Kabul River. The
Kabul River flows east from the Sanglakh Range
northwest of Kabul, passing through the cities of Kabul
and Jalalabad, before crossing the Durand Line near Lal
Pur in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. The Kabul River
enters Pakistan from the northwestern border and is
joined by smaller rivers before flowing into the Indus
River and then into the Arabian Sea.[11]
It should be noted that the Kabul River Basin is a
transboundary water system between Afghanistan and
Pakistan. It is an important part of regional water
security for both countries. The Kabul River has a total
length of 700 kilometers, of which 460 kilometers flow
through Afghanistan and 240 kilometers through
Pakistan [2]. The river basin covers 11 percent of the
territory of Afghanistan [10]. In other words, this basin
covers 53 thousand square kilometers of Afghanistan
and 14 thousand square kilometers of Pakistan [11].
According to statistics from 2023, the Kabul River
provides about 21 billion cubic meters of water per year
[2]. However, the volume of the river is given differently
in different sources. For example, an article published in
2024 states that it produces 6.9 billion cubic meters of
water in Afghanistan and 1.9 billion cubic meters in
Pakistan [10]. Afghanistan uses the Kabul River water to
irrigate 12,000 hectares of land [11], while Pakistan uses
canals to irrigate 80 percent of Peshawar, 85 percent of
Charsadda, and 47.5 percent of Nowshera.[3] This in
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itself shows how important the river is to both
countries.
It is a vital resource for the agriculture-based economy
of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province
in
particular. In fact, the river is the main source of
drinking water for millions of people living on the
Pakistani side of the Durand Line [3]. Water is one of
the most important tools for the development of the
economies of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Therefore, its
free flow must be managed through a specific water
management system.[2]
According to Faiz Zaland, a professor at Kabul
University and a water expert, the lack of a centralized
government in Afghanistan over the past 40 years has
hindered the process of concluding a treaty.
Muhammad Iqbal, a researcher at the University of
Punjab in Lahore, writes in his dissertation: “From 2001
to 2014, Pakistan made numerous diplomatic efforts,
both bilaterally and through the World Bank and the
international community, to develop a mechanism for
exchanging information and concluding a treaty on the
Kabul River. Afghanistan, however, refused to engage
in dialogue, citing a lack of information, poor
negotiating skills, and an imperfect water policy.”
[8]
Of particular note is the lack of a bilateral treaty
between Pakistan and Afghanistan governing the use
of water resources, which is at the root of the dispute.
Such an agreement could have prevented the current
disruptions in water management. For example,
Afgh
anistan’s refusal to participate in a World Bank
-
sponsored water cooperation conference in 2006 has
hindered developments that could have eased
tensions. Another historical factor contributing to the
conflict is the 1921 Kabul Treaty, signed between
Afghanistan and British India. This treaty granted
British officials and tribes in what is now Pakistan the
right to use the Kabul River for irrigation and
navigation. However, Afghanistan later denied
Pakistan’s legal succession to these rights, arguing that
these rights were not inherited after the partition of
British India. This objection became the main basis of
Afghanistan's claims over the river.[7]
There is no mechanism for cooperation between
Afghanistan and Pakistan on tributaries of the Indus
River Basin. However, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the
international community have made efforts to
formalize water sharing between the two neighboring
countries. At least six attempts have been made since
2003[6], but these attempts have failed. This is mainly
due to the instability of the Afghan government,
terrorism and security problems. No general
agreement has been signed to improve relations
between the two countries, and no joint projects have
been launched in cooperation between the two
sides.[2] Regarding the Taliban's water policy in
Afghanistan, and in particular its relations with Pakistan,
Ikramuddin Kamil, Special Assistant to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs for Water and Energy, told the Third
Pole: "In the current situation, Afghanistan is not ready
to sign an agreement with Pakistan, because the
international convention on transboundary rivers serves
the interests of the countries that developed it." [8].
The Taliban continues to work on several projects
supported by former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and
his predecessors. These include the Kajaki Dam in
Helmand Province, the Kamal Khan Dam in Nimroz
Province, and the Namak Ob Canal in Takhar Province.
Construction is also underway on the Turi Dam in Zabul
Province. The Taliban government, on the other hand, is
demanding the completion of the Shah and Arus Dam
on the Kabul River.[12]
Pakistan is concerned about the overall damming
activity on the Kabul River, particularly the Indian-
sponsored Shahtoot Dam. The memorandum on this
dam was signed in February 2021. Pakistan's concerns
stem from the lack of a bilateral agreement or
mechanism for cooperation on the Kabul and Chitral
rivers, and India's support and involvement. Although
Pakistan has adopted a unilateral strategy to build
reservoirs in Chitral without informing Afghanistan, it is
concerned that India will use its position to pressure
Pakistan from both sides.[13]
According to the statement of Ikramuddin Kamil, the
Special Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for
Water and Energy of the
Taliban government: “Any
construction work carried out in the Kabul River basin
has always had a negative impact on bilateral relations
with Pakistan. In the future, Kabul may implement joint
hydropower projects. Under these projects, Afghanistan
will supply water to Pakistan for irrigation and in return
will reach agreements on transit trade and services.
Afghanistan has proposed 12 projects on the Kabul River
and its tributaries, and five dams - Chak, Mahipar,
Sarawbi, Naghalao and Dronaq dams - have been
completed and are currently operational.” He added
that Afghanistan has identified 12 more water storage
sites on the Kabul River and its tributaries, with a total
water storage capacity of 4.7 million acre feet
(approximately 5.8 cubic kilometers) [8].
The situation has become more tense as Afghanistan
continues to build 12 dams on the Kabul River, with a
total capacity of 1,177 megawatts of electricity. The
Salma Dam on the Harirud River and the Shahtut Dam
on the Kabul River are being supported by India. These
initiatives are expected to significantly reduce the flow
of water to Pakistan. Estimates suggest that the flow
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could decrease by 16-17 percent. This will have a
serious impact on the water supply of Pakistan,
especially in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.
Already experiencing water scarcity, per capita water
availability in Pakistan has fallen from 5,000 cubic
meters in the 1960s to less than 1,000 cubic meters
today. This is severely affecting the agrarian economy,
which relies on 63 percent of its agricultural land for
water.[7]
Afghanistan plans to build 13 dams and reservoirs on
the upper reaches of the Kabul River. Once these
structures are completed, the flow of water to Pakistan
will be sharply reduced. This poses a serious food and
security crisis in northwestern Pakistan, as millions of
people living in the Peshawar Valley depend on the
waters of the Kabul River for their livelihoods. In
addition to the dam construction, urbanization,
climate change, deforestation, reduced rainfall, and
inadequate conservation measures are also negatively
affecting irrigation, wastewater treatment, and
drinking water supply in the Peshawar Valley.[11]
This situation could become a serious problem in the
future. Any water diversion in the Chitral River on the
Pakistani side of the Kabul River basin could negatively
affect the population living on the Afghan side of the
basin. As a result, in the absence of a regulatory
framework between the two riparian states, shared
waters could cause serious disputes.[3]
This is a serious threat for a country like Pakistan,
which is heavily dependent on agriculture. According
to a report by the World Resources Institute, even
without taking into account the potential decline in
water flow from the Kabul River, Pakistan could
become the most water-scarce country in the region
by 2040.[14]
CONCLUSION
In general, the water factor is of decisive importance
today for countries to develop long-term strategies
and conduct their foreign policy on this basis.
Consequently, in international relations, there are
cases of the use of water diplomacy between countries
to ensure water security. Relations between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, in particular, the impact of
the water factor on the security issues of the two
countries, is considered one of the most priority areas
of the policy of these countries. Afghanistan and
Pakistan, which share the waters of 9 rivers in total, still
do not have a single legal basis for control over these
rivers, that is, they have not signed a bilateral
document-agreement regulating the use of water
resources. This, of course, can cause conflicts in the use
of river water for various purposes. In particular, the
projects being built and planned on the Kabul River;
The lack of an agreement on dams and reservoirs could
further strain relations between the two neighbors and
lead to the emergence of acute problems. The situation
is likely to threaten the security of not only Afghanistan
and Pakistan, but also neighboring countries.
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