International Journal of Law And Criminology
51
https://theusajournals.com/index.php/ijlc
VOLUME
Vol.05 Issue06 2025
PAGE NO.
51-58
10.37547/ijlc/Volume05Issue06-11
Functional Classification and Liability Standards of
Information Intermediaries: The U.S. Dmca Model and
Its Implementation Prospects in The Legal System of
Uzbekistan
Umidbek Khudayberdiyevich Nurullayev
Independent Researcher, University of Public Security of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan
Received:
25 April 2025;
Accepted:
21 May 2025;
Published:
23 June 2025
Abstract:
In the era of digital transformation, information intermediaries such as internet service providers,
hosting platforms, and content aggregators play a central role in the dissemination, storage, and accessibility of
information across digital networks. As their influence on communication, commerce, and public discourse
expands, so does the legal necessity to regulate their activities, particularly with respect to civil liability for
unlawful content distributed through their services.
Keywords:
Digital transformation, information intermediaries, service providers, hosting platforms.
Introduction:
In the era of digital transformation,
information intermediaries such as internet service
providers, hosting platforms, and content aggregators
play a central role in the dissemination, storage, and
accessibility of information across digital networks. As
their influence on communication, commerce, and
public discourse expands, so does the legal necessity to
regulate their activities, particularly with respect to civil
liability for unlawful content distributed through their
services.
International legal practice recognizes various
terminologies for these entities, including “information
providers,” “digital intermediaries,” and “online service
providers.” The dominant trend, however, is toward a
functional classification of intermediaries based on the
nature of their role in handling digital content. This
approach allows for a more precise delineation of
liability standards, balancing the rights of content
owners with the technological neutrality of
intermediaries.
One of the most influential legal models in this regard
is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of the
United States, particularly Section 512, which
introduces the “safe harbor” mechanism. This
framework classifies intermediaries into distinct
functional categories transitory digital network
communications providers, caching providers, hosting
providers, and information location tools
—
and defines
the specific conditions under which each may be
exempt from liability.
While the DMCA model has been widely studied and
partially adopted in various jurisdictions, Uzbekistan
has yet to develop a comprehensive legal framework
governing the status and liability of information
intermediaries. Existing sectoral legislation refers to
concepts such as “internet providers” or “information
distributors,” bu
t lacks a coherent and enforceable
classification system. As a result, courts and regulators
face uncertainty when determining intermediary
liability, often leading to inconsistencies in legal
interpretation and enforcement.
In international practice, information intermediaries
are commonly referred to as “information providers ”,
“digital intermediaries ” or “online service providers .”
In most cases, a functional classification approach is
applied to determine the scope and limits of their legal
liabilit
y. For example, the European Union’s E
-
Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC) distinguishes
between different types of intermediaries such as
“mere conduit” providers, “caching” services, and
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“hosting” providers and introduces a “safe harbor”
regime applicable to each category. Under this regime,
an intermediary may be exempt from liability if it does
not influence the content being transmitted, stored, or
made available, and if it acts in a passive, technical
capacity under specified conditions.
In U.S. law, Section 512 of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) establishes a “notice and
takedown”
mechanism
for
information
intermediaries. This system determines whether an
intermediary is liable or exempt from liability based on
its active or passive role, its awareness of infringing
content, and its response upon receiving notification. If
the intermediary is notified of infringing content and
takes appropriate action within a specified timeframe,
it may benefit from immunity under the DMCA’s safe
harbor provisions. This mechanism allows the legal
system to assess the intermediary's function on a
spectrum ranging from purely technical transmission to
substantive involvement in content, offering a nuanced
basis for determining liability.
Article 1253.1 of the Civil Code of the Russian
Federation recognizes the concept of an information
intermediary and establishes general conditions
regarding their liability. However, it does not provide a
clear legal framework for differentiating between
various types of intermediaries such as technical
transmitters, caching services, hosting providers, or
content aggregators. This lack of detailed classification
leads to ambiguities in legal practice when assessing
intermediary liability. Russian legislation applies a
generalized approach to intermediaries, without
considering their degree of involvement or influence
over the content, as is done under U.S. law. The “notice
and takedown” procedure, central to the DMCA, is not
formally established in Russian law, and the criteria for
exemption from liability are insufficiently defined.
Furthermore, state control over intermediaries in
Russia is relatively strict, and service providers are
often held responsible for the content they transmit or
store. As a result, the U.S. model with its functional and
clearly defined classification of intermediaries has been
adopted in this study as a more precise and legally
coherent foundation. U.S. law regulates intermediaries
based on their specific roles and degrees of influence
over content, assigning tailored legal regimes and
liability standards accordingly.
Moreover, Section 512 of the DMCA establishes a
distinct “safe harbor” mechanism for each category of
information intermediary. This system allows liability to
be assessed based on the in
termediary’s level of
control over the content, its degree of involvement,
and its awareness of the infringing material. For
instance, under the notice and takedown mechanism,
if a user uploads infringing content, the intermediary
can be exempt from liability provided that, upon
receiving proper notification, it takes timely and
appropriate action to remove or disable access to the
content. This approach is not a one-sided privilege for
intermediaries, but rather a balanced legal solution
designed to protect both content owners and
intermediaries. It promotes cooperation, fosters legal
certainty, and ensures that digital platforms act
responsibly while not being unduly burdened with
liability for content over which they have no control .
In Uzbekistan, the concept of an information
intermediary has not yet been developed as an
independent legal institution. Although existing
sectoral laws refer to terms such as “internet provider”,
“hosting service” or “information distributor” these
references remain fragmented, and the legal status,
scope of liability, and role in civil law relations of such
entities are not clearly defined. This legal gap has led to
inconsistencies
in
law
enforcement
practice,
uncertainty in assigning liability, and a lack of effective
oversight mechanisms. As a result, there is an urgent
need
in
Uzbekistan
to
classify
information
intermediaries based on their function, to define their
legal status, and to establish liability criteria in
accordance with a functional approach. In this regard,
the U.S. model, particularly the structure provided
under Section 512 of the DMCA, represents a leading
international practice. Adopting and adapting this
model to Uzbekistan’s legal system would offer a
coherent framework for regulating intermediaries,
ensuring legal clarity, protecting rights holders, and
fostering the development of a responsible and
predictable digital ecosystem.
Under U.S. law, the legal status of information
intermediaries is not defined at a general or abstract
level, but rather is governed by a functional
classification based on the nature of their activities and
the degree of control or influence over content . This
regulatory approach is primarily established under the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), which rely on the
“safe harbor” mechanism to limit the liability of
intermediaries while ensuring the free flow of digital
information. Within the framework of Section 512 of
the DMCA, information intermediaries are divided into
the following four specific categories:
1.
Transitory Digital Network Communications
Providers
–
These are intermediaries responsible for
the automatic, continuous, and purely technical
transmission of data from one point to another at the
initiative of a user. Their primary function is to act as a
“neutral tunnel” within the flow of information. Such
providers neither store, edit, nor select the transmitted
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data they merely facilitate its passage across the
network. Examples include internet service providers
(ISPs) such as AT&T, Verizon, or Xfinity . For instance,
when a user sends a request from their device to view
a video on YouTube, this request is transmitted through
the ISP to YouTube’s servers, and the video data is then
returned to the user’s device via t
he same provider.
During this process, the ISP does not alter or retain the
data in any way, nor does it interact with its content.
This neutral and purely technical role defines its legal
status as a transitory digital network communications
provider .
2.
System Caching Providers
–
These providers
temporarily store data that has been transmitted at the
initiative of a user, in order to make it more efficiently
accessible to other users on the network for technical
reasons. The data is cached for a limited duration based
on specific criteria such as storage capacity, server load,
or the frequency of user requests. Caching providers do
not alter the data, do not interfere with its content, and
always provide a reference to the original source from
which the data was obtained. Their main function is to
enable faster and more efficient delivery of content
without requiring it to be reloaded from the source
server each time . For example, when searching for a
website using Google, you may have noticed a link
la
beled “Cached” in the search results. Clicking on this
link opens a temporarily stored version of the page on
Google’s server. In this case, Google is acting as a
system caching provider. It did not create the content,
but cached it to deliver it to the user more quickly.
However, if a notification is received that the cached
content infringes rights, Google must promptly remove
it; otherwise, it may lose its eligibility for safe harbor
protection .
3.
Hosting Providers
–
These are platforms that
store user-uploaded content on servers for extended
periods and make it publicly accessible online. Hosting
providers do not create the content themselves; rather,
they receive, store, and deliver it through technical
means without altering its substance . Examples of such
services include website hosting platforms (e.g.,
GoDaddy, Bluehost), video-sharing platforms (e.g.,
YouTube, Vimeo), and file storage services (e.g.,
Dropbox, Google Drive). In these cases, users upload
content independently, and the provider ensures its
storage and delivery without interfering with the
content itself. For instance, when a user uploads a
copyright-protected video to YouTube, the platform
does not create the video but facilitates its distribution.
Such providers serve as central technical platforms for
long-term content storage and dissemination.
However, from a legal perspective, they are
conditionally liable and may benefit from safe harbor
protection only if they meet specific legal
requirements
—
such as acting promptly upon receiving
a valid infringement notice and not exerting editorial
control over the content .
4.
Information Location Tools Providers
–
These
are platforms that guide internet users to the source of
information
without
storing
the
information
themselves. Their core function is to provide access by
linking users to content through hyperlinks, search
engine results, or web directories, rather than hosting
or transmitting the content directly. Examples include
search engines such as Google, Bing, and Yahoo Search,
web-based directories, or collections of hyperlinks
embedded within websites. These providers do not
store or modify content but simply direct users to the
relevant external sources, serving as navigational
intermediaries in the digital environment.
Based on this principle, transitory digital network
communication providers under U.S. law are not
regarded as active participants influencing the content
within information networks, but rather as entities that
serve solely as technical intermediaries . Section
§512(a) of the DMCA reflects this principle of neutrality
and passivity, stating that if a provider automatically
transmits information without altering or selecting it,
they cannot be held liable for copyright infringement.
Examples of such providers include internet service
operators like AT&T, Comcast, and Verizon, which act
as “information tunnels” enabling the flow of data from
one user to another. These providers do not select,
edit, or process information, nor do they evaluate its
legal or ethical content. The data is transmitted exactly
as received, without any modification. Therefore,
transitory digital network providers are granted a
special status as neutral intermediaries, and liability
arises only if the specific conditions outlined in the law
are violated.
Under U.S. law, the rights of transitory digital network
communication providers in the transmission of
information, as well as the conditions for the
application of these rights, are clearly outlined in
Section 512(a) of the DMCA. According to this
provision, Internet service providers (ISPs) that merely
transmit information in a technical and automatic
manner are not held liable for copyright infringement,
provided that specific conditions are met. In particular,
under §512(a), a provider shall not be liable for
transmitting infringing content if the transmission:
was initiated by a user and transmitted between
selected recipients without modification by the
provider;
−
was temporarily stored during transmission
only to the extent necessary to carry out the
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transmission and solely by an automatic technical
process;
−
was transmitted through the provider’s
system automatically, without the provider selecting
the content or controlling the transmission;
−
was deleted automatically or removed
immediately after transmission was completed;
−
was not modified by the provider, and the
provider did not know or could not reasonably be
expected to know that the material was infringing.
Thus, Section 512(a) not only grants legal immunity
(“safe harbor”) to transitory digital communication
providers, but also strictly limits its application to
specific, narrowly defined conditions. If a provider
violates any of these conditions for example, by
modifying content, selecting what to transmit, or
having actual knowledge of the infringement they lose
the protection of safe harbor and may be held liable.
Under U.S. law, the legal status of transitory digital
network communication providers is based on their
role as neutral and passive technical intermediaries. In
order to maintain this status, they must fulfill certain
obligations clearly regulated under Sections 512(a) and
512(m) of the DMCA. The law requires the provider to
transmit information solely in a technical, automatic,
and unaltered manner . As this activity designates the
provider as a “neutral intermediary,” they are granted
immunity from liability under the “safe harbor”
protection. The provider must receive data initiated by
the user and transmit it automatically. The information
must be delivered exactly in the form it was received,
through a purely technical route.
According to Section 512(m) of the DMCA, a provider
must not have prior knowledge that the transmitted
information infringes copyright. If the provider knew or
should have known about the infringement and failed
to act such as by not removing the content or halting
its transmission it may be held liable, even in the
absence of direct knowledge. In such cases, the
provider can be deemed to have had "constructive
knowledge" based on the circumstances, facts, or
environment surrounding the infringement. This would
disqualify the provider from benefiting from the “safe
harbor” protection .
In U.S. legislation, Section 512(a) of the DMCA, which
regulates the activities of transitory digital network
communications providers, is recognized as a leading
and exemplary legal approach in terms of clearly
defining the legal status of information intermediaries,
establishing a mechanism for exemption from liability
(“safe harbor”), and supporting the
stable functioning
of the Internet infrastructure. This law has influenced a
number of international legal models, in particular the
EU’s E
-
Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC) and Japan’s
Act on the Limitation of Liability for Damages of
Specified Telecommunications Service Providers .
However, despite being a comprehensive system, U.S.
law still faces certain controversial and disputable
issues related to the legal regulation of the activities of
transitory digital network providers, which are
significant not only theoretically but also practically.
Firstly
, the civil-law clarity of the "neutral
intermediary" status is one of the most contentious
issues
regarding
transitory
digital
network
communications providers. Under Section 512(a) of the
DMCA, these entities are defined as passive subjects
whose sole function is to transmit information in an
automatic and technical manner, without intervening
in the content. This status allows them to be exempt
from liability for copyright infringement, provided they
transmit data without affecting its content. However,
in practice, determining this status is complex, as
providers often perform technical tasks such as
encryption, routing, caching, and traffic optimization.
Although these processes do not directly alter the
content, they can influence the speed and accessibility
of data across the network. As a result, evaluating such
providers strictly as passive intermediaries presents
legal challenges. The DMCA does not clearly delineate
the regulatory boundary between these technical
services and active involvement .
Secondly
, the conditions of not altering or editing
information are crucial for exemption from civil
liability. According to Section 512(a) of the DMCA, a
provider must transmit information in an "unmodified,
mechanical" form . If this condition is violated, the
provider may lose safe harbor protection and be held
liable for the infringement . In practice, data may be
altered for technical reasons such as caching,
encryption, or transcoding. These changes typically
affect the format, not the content. For instance, if a
video is adjusted to a lower resolution via a CDN for
efficient delivery, and the substance remains intact, the
provider is still considered a passive intermediary .
However, if the content is changed in a visual, logical,
or semantic way such as inserting advertisements or
trimming sections this qualifies as editing, and the
provider loses protection. Therefore, whether a
technical modification affects the content is the key
assessment criterion. In court practice, this boundary is
not clearly defined and is evaluated case by case.
Thirdly
, the distinction between user initiation and
automatic transmission plays a critical role in assessing
the civil liability of transitory digital network
communication providers. Under Section 512(a) of the
DMCA, a provider is entitled to safe harbor protection
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only if the transmission was initiated by the user .
Therefore, determining who initiated the data transfer
defines whether the provider is a passive or active
actor. If the transfer occurs directly due to user actions
such as sending a request, uploading content, or
opening a page the provider is considered a purely
technical intermediary and is not held liable. However,
in practice, content may be delivered automatically via
systems like CDNs or push notifications without any
user input. In such cases, the initiative may be deemed
to originate from the provider's system, classifying the
provider as an active participant and limiting its access
to safe harbor. For instance, if a user has not consented
to receive notifications but the provider sends them
automatically, the initiative is not user-driven .
Conversely, if the user consented during app
installation to receive certain automatic messages,
subsequent transmissions may be seen as an extension
of that user-initiated act. Hence, determining user
initiative depends on context, the degree of technical
intervention, and any prior consent, all of which are
essential for defining the provider's legal status under
civil law.
Fourthly
, the concept of “constructive knowledge”
regarding infringing content is one of the more
nuanced issues in determining the civil liability of
transitory digital network communication providers.
Under Section 512(m) of the DMCA, a provider is not
required to monitor or actively supervise the content
being transmitted, meaning that to maintain its passive
intermediary status, the provider is not legally
obligated to engage in oversight. However, in practice,
if a provider is presented with clear and visible
indicators of copyright or other legal infringements and
fails to act, it may be deemed to have had “sufficient
knowledge” . In other words, even if the provider was
not directly notified, the circumstances may be
considered such th
at the provider “should have
known” about the infringement because the situation
provided reasonable grounds for awareness . This legal
standard is abstract and lacks a fixed threshold, making
its application context-dependent. For instance, if user-
uploaded content visibly includes a famous brand logo,
a movie clip, or a recognizable piece of music, and the
provider takes no action, a court may infer that the
provider had constructive knowledge of the
infringement.
In U.S. law, the civil liability status of caching service
providers regulated under Section 512(b) of the DMCA
is based on their role as neutral, technical
intermediaries that temporarily store user-requested
data to improve the efficiency of information delivery.
These providers do not create, modify, or control
content, but instead act as passive transit points that
reduce network congestion and accelerate user access.
To qualify for “safe harbor” immunity from copyright
infringement liability, caching providers must meet
specific legal conditions: (1) they must not alter the
stored content; (2) they must preserve access to the
original source; (3) caching must follow technical
parameters such as server load, reuse frequency, or
automated expiration rules; and (4) they must
promptly remove or restrict access to infringing
material upon receiving a valid notice. These strict
criteria ensure that the caching provider remains a non-
infringing, passive conduit, entitled to legal protection
only when acting within the bounds of neutral
functionality.
It should be noted that while U.S. law particularly
DMCA §512(b) provides a foundational legal basis for
exempting caching service providers from civil liability,
the practical application of these provisions remains
imprecise and incomplete. The law sets out general
conditions such as the requirement that caching
providers must not modify the content, must ensure
redirection to the original source, and must act
promptly upon notice of infringement. However, the
statute does not clearly define how or within what
timeframe these conditions must be fulfilled to be
considered “adequate,” nor does it clarify to what
extent technical processing remains “non
-
impactful,”
or what exactly constitutes “expeditious” removal .
These ambiguities create legal uncertainty in
determining the exact liability status of caching service
providers. In judicial practice, courts interpret these
standards differently, which affects a provider’s ability
to claim safe harbor protection and increases the risk
of civil liability. The case Field v. Google Inc. serves as
a key precedent illustrating these legal uncertainties in
practice. In this case, Blake Field alleged that Google’s
caching of materials from his personal website and
their subsequent display in search results infringed his
copyright. Although Field did not use a “robots.txt” file
to technically prohibit caching, he claimed that Google
stored and served his content for an extended period
without his consent. Google countered that it had
stored the content temporarily, automatically, and in
an unaltered form, and that the display occurred only
at the initiative of the user’s search query. The court
evaluated Google’s conduct and concluded that: (1)
Google did not alter the content and stored it as-is; (2)
the cached content was delivered automatically in
response to user action; (3) Google had not been
technically instructed to avoid caching (e.g., via
robots.txt); and (4) Google had no knowledge of any
infringement and performed caching based on
objective technical criteria. Thus, the court deemed
Google a passive intermediary eligible for safe harbor
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protection under §512(b), highlighting the nuanced
and context-dependent nature of caching provider
liability.
Therefore, Google was recognized as a caching
provider eligible for "safe harbor" protection and was
not held civilly liable. However, a critical aspect of this
case is that the court’s reasoning largely relied on
vague legal concepts. Terms such as “information was
stored automatically,” “processed due to technical
nec
essity,” and “insufficient notice” are not precisely
defined within the statute itself. Had Field placed a file
on his website explicitly prohibiting Google from
caching (e.g., a robots.txt directive), the outcome might
have been different. Similarly, if Google had stored the
content for an extended period or had altered the
content in any way, the court could have deemed
Google an active participant, which would have
disqualified it from safe harbor protection. Thus, this
case demonstrates that the ability of caching service
providers to benefit from safe harbor often depends on
specific technical and legal circumstances. While the
statute provides general rules, their application is
subject to judicial interpretation, which introduces
uncertainty in defining the civil legal status of such
intermediaries.
Providers that engage in the long-term storage of user-
directed content on servers
—
such as website hosting
services (e.g., GoDaddy, Bluehost), video content
platforms (e.g., YouTube, Vimeo), and file hosting
services (e.g., Dropbox, Google Drive) are granted a
specific legal status under Section 512(c) of the DMCA.
This provision establishes a “safe harbor” that limits
their civil liability for copyright infringement. However,
this legal protection is not automatic; it applies only if
the provider strictly complies with a set of prescribed
conditions.
U.S. law does not regard hosting providers as directly
liable parties, but rather as technical platforms that
serve as intermediaries in storing and transmitting
user-generated content. In this framework, if a hosting
provider does not exercise direct control over the
content uploaded by users, does not modify that
content, and takes timely and appropriate action after
receiving formal notice of infringement, it may be
exempt from liability. This approach acknowledges that
the provider’s role is not to create content, but to store
and deliver it on a technical level. Section 512(c) of the
DMCA outlines specific conditions for eligibility under
this safe harbor protection, including the following:
−
he content must have been uploaded by a
user;
−
the provider must not control or edit the
content;
−
the provider must not have actual or
reliable knowledge of any infringement within the
content;
−
upon receiving formal notification of
infringement, the provider must act promptly to
remove or disable access to the content in accordance
with the "notice and takedown" procedure.
This mechanism enables hosting providers to maintain
technical neutrality in their activities related to
collecting, storing, and delivering content. At the same
time, it creates a predictable and clearly defined legal
environment for entities operating in the information
sphere. A notable example illustrating this is the case
of Viacom Int’l Inc.
v. YouTube, Inc. In this dispute,
Viacom accused YouTube of unlawfully distributing
copyrighted videos uploaded by users. YouTube, in its
defense, presented itself not as a content creator but
as a platform acting as a technical intermediary storing
data at the initiative of users. It emphasized that it did
not edit the content, was not actively involved, and
took action only after receiving formal notice of
infringement, in line with the DMCA’s "notice and
takedown" procedure. The court, considering
YouTub
e’s conduct, found it to be a neutral technical
intermediary rather than an active participant, and
ruled that it was entitled to safe harbor protection
under DMCA §512(c).
Under U.S. law, specifically DMCA §512(d), the civil
legal status of providers of information location tools
such as search engines or hyperlink directories is
defined as that of conditional intermediaries who are
not directly liable for the content to which they refer,
but may bear liability under certain circumstances .
These providers do not create or host the content
themselves; rather, they assist users in locating
information by directing them to the appropriate
online sources. From a civil liability standpoint, they are
not considered direct infringers, but rather
intermediary entities whose liability depends on their
knowledge and response to infringing content. If such
a provider is unaware of any infringement at the linked
location and, upon receiving formal notification,
promptly removes or disables the link, it will be
shielded from civil liability. However, if the provider
deviates from this neutral intermediary role by, for
example, failing to act after becoming aware of an
infringement it may then be held liable .
In Uzbekistan’s legal system, the civil status and
functional classification of information intermediaries
remain underdeveloped. Although terms such as
“Internet provider,” “information distributor,” and
“information service provider” appear in existing l
aws
including the Laws “On Informatization,” “On
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Electronic Commerce,” “On Mass Media,” and in
certain ministerial regulations they are largely
declarative in nature and fail to establish clear legal
status, liability standards, or criteria for active versus
passive roles. As a result, entities involved in temporary
technical transmission and those engaged in
permanent data storage are treated identically under
the law. This leads to a misallocation of liability,
ambiguity in judicial practice, and failure to recognize
the intermediary’s neutral role. For example, a provider
that merely transmits data automatically without
exercising control over the content may still be held
liable in the same manner as a hosting provider, despite
their fundamentally different functions.
In Uzbek legislation, the civil law status and functional
classification of information intermediaries are
insufficiently developed. While terms such as “Internet
provider,” “information distributor,” and “information
service provider” appear in laws like the Law “On
Informatization,” the Law “On Electronic Commerce,”
the Law “On Mass Media,” and certain regulatory acts,
these terms are primarily declarative in nature and do
not provide clear legal definitions regarding the
intermediary’s sta
tus, liability, or criteria for
determining active versus passive conduct. As a result,
entities engaged in temporary technical transmission
of data and those involved in permanent storage are
treated under the same legal framework. This leads to
incorrect allocation of liability, legal uncertainty in
judicial practice, and failure to acknowledge the neutral
role of intermediaries. For example, an automated
transmission provider despite having no control over
content could be held liable in the same way as a
hosting provider.
In contrast, the United States through Sections 512 of
the DMCA provides a clear functional classification of
intermediaries (including technical transmission
providers, caching providers, hosting services, and
information location tool
s), introducing a “safe harbor”
regime for each type. Uzbekistan’s legal system,
however, lacks such a functional approach and
conditional liability model. This absence contributes to
uncertainty in judicial practice and increases legal risks
for digital service providers. Therefore, it is proposed
that the U.S. model be adapted into national legislation
by: clearly defining categories of intermediaries;
establishing legal conditions limiting liability for each
type (such as non-modification of information, lack of
initiative, implementation of the notice-and-takedown
procedure, etc.); and distinguishing between active and
passive intermediary functions. This reform is both
timely and necessary.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. DMCA model, particularly Section 512, offers
a comprehensive and functionally nuanced legal
framework for regulating the civil liability of
information
intermediaries.
By
classifying
intermediaries
into
distinct
roles
transitory
communications providers, caching providers, hosting
providers, and information location tools the DMCA
establishes tailored "safe harbor" regimes that balance
the rights of content owners with the need to maintain
technological neutrality and the free flow of digital
information.
In contrast, Uzbekistan’s legal system lacks
such a
functional classification and continues to treat
fundamentally different types of intermediaries under
a uniform legal regime. This results in legal uncertainty,
inconsistent enforcement, and misallocation of
liability, especially in cases involving passive
intermediaries with no editorial control over content.
To address these gaps, it is recommended that
Uzbekistan adopt a legal framework modeled after the
DMCA’s functional approach. This would involve:
−
introducing
precise
definitions
and
categories of information intermediaries;
−
establishing differentiated liability regimes
based on the degree of control and involvement with
content;
−
implementing procedural safeguards such
as the notice-and-takedown system;
−
recognizing the distinction between active
and passive intermediary functions.
By aligning with international best practices,
Uzbekistan can foster a more predictable, fair, and
innovation-friendly digital environment while ensuring
adequate protection of intellectual property rights and
legal accountability where appropriate.
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