International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
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VOLUME
Vol.05 Issue08 2025
PAGE NO.
14-23
10.37547/ijhps/Volume05Issue08-03
Decoupling from Moscow: Shifting Labor Migration
Policies in Central Asia
Madina Matnazarova
A recent graduate of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Received:
16 June 2025;
Accepted:
12 July 2025;
Published:
14 August 2025
Abstract:
This paper examines the evolving labor migration policies in Central Asia in response to the geopolitical
shifts following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the tightening of labor migration laws in Russia. Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are the focus of the study since they are the most economically reliant on remittances
sent by labor migrants in the Russian Federation. The paper also discusses Kazakhstan, as it is the second biggest
host of Central Asian migrants. It highlights the trend towards diversifying labor migration destinations to Europe
and Asia in an attempt to reduce the economic dependence on Russia. Due to limited data, the paper provides an
overview of Turkmenistan’s labor migration situation. The paper concludes by offering policy rec
ommendations.
Keywords:
Central Asia, Russia, migrants, remittances, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, economic
risks, GDP, governance.
Introduction:
Central Asian migrants contribute
significantly to the Russian economy, filling labor
shortages. They are heavily involved in construction,
transportation, and urban services. For decades,
Central Asian workers have been moving to Russia in
search of higher wages and more employment
opportunities not found in their home countries. The
appeal of the Russian job market is further amplified by
its proximity to the region, strong economic, political
and historical ties, common cultural and linguistic
legacy.
There are about 10.5 million migrants from Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan working in Russia, according
to the Russian Interior Ministry. Many more are
potentially unregistered. While these migrants
contribute to the Russian economy, they also face
challenges including legal uncertainties, potential
exploitation, and xenophobia, particularly after events
like the Crocus City Hall attack.
In the past, threats to tighten immigration policies were
sometimes used as a coercion tool by Russia against
Central Asian and other countries. In 2019, for
example, Russia implemented more restrictive policies
targeting immigrants from outside the Eurasian
Economic Union (EEU), including Tajikistan, as a way to
pressure the country to join the EEU, where regulations
for citizens of member states are laxer.
Contribution from remittances is difficult to dismiss.
Remittances received from the migrants accounted for
roughly 18.8% (2023) of Kyrgyzstan’s, 47.9% (2024) of
Tajikistan’s and 14.4% (2024) of Uzbekistan’s GDPs
according to the World Bank. For Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan the intentions of Russia to
regulate and limit labor migration are clearly a factor of
risk.
Enlistment of labor migrants, especially those from
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and their placement at the
frontlines in Ukraine is becoming a tendency. It is
estimated that over three thousand people from
Central Asia now serve in the Russian army, according
to the “I want to live” project of the Ministry of Defense
of Ukraine. Russian officials have also acknowledged
the recruitment of migrants. Alexander Bastrykin, head
of Russia’s Investigative Committee, stated during a
legal forum in St. Petersburg that his office had
identified around 80,000 individuals who received
Russian citizenship but then attempted to evade
military service. Of those, approximately 20,000 are
currently serving on the front lines in Ukraine.
Reports suggest that Russian army representatives
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International Journal Of History And Political Sciences (ISSN
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have been enticing migrants with promises of fast
money through short-term enlistment. These are not
professional soldiers. They are more likely former
cleaners, street sweepers, construction workers,
undocumented migrants, often trapped in legal limbo,
lured with false promises of fast-track Russian
citizenship or pulled straight from prisons and
detention centers.
Moreover, the deadly terrorist attack that occurred in
the Moscow region at the Crocus City Hall on March 22,
2024, has intensified anti-migrant rhetoric by far-right
nationalist groups and led to a nationwide increase in
xenophobia. Four Tajik nationals were found to be
responsible for killing 137 people and leaving 100
injured as a result of the Crocus City Hall attack. It is
believed that the jihadist ISIS-Khorasan militant group
has organized the crime. The slogan “
Russia for
Russians” has been popularized by ultranationalists.
This anti-migration campaign has been embraced by
the Russian government, which has passed several
legislative documents with an objective of tightening
the rules regarding labor migrants. In the summer of
2024, Russian authorities amended laws regulating the
legal status of foreigners in Russia to grant police
broader authority to expel migrants without specific
court orders. A bill on the introduction of new state
fees for administrative services for migrants has passed
its first reading in mid-2025. Kindergartens, schools,
colleges and universities are under the obligation of
providing regular information to the Russian Ministry of
Internal Affairs on their foreign students following
another Duma law. The children of the people, who
appear on the Controlled Persons Register, are being
denied admission unless they prove their Russian
language proficiency. Raids are carried out constantly
on Central Asian migrants and businesses. A steady
increase in discrimination cases is being observed.
Cases of migrants being detained for no reason are also
not rare.
Human Rights Watch condemned the increased
hostility and the government’s anti
-migrant policies
towards Central Asians by releasing a 63-page report,
“Living in Fear and Humiliation: Rising Xenophobic
Harassment and Violence towards Central Asian
Migrants in Russia” on March 17, 2025.
These discriminatory policies and xenophobia have led
to many Central Asian migrants fleeing Russia.
According to the Tajik migration Agency, in the first half
of 2024, Tajik labor migration to Russia fell by 16%,
from 467,300 to 392,800 migrants. According to the
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, 650,000 migrants
from Kyrgyzstan were registered in 2023. At the end of
2024, this figure has halved to 350,000 people.
According to the Migration Agency of Uzbekistan, the
decline in interest of migrants from Uzbekistan in
Russia is noticeable. While 1.2 million migrants from
Uzbekistan were working in this country at the end of
2023, this number dropped to 698,000 by the end of
2024.
The past few years have exposed the fragile economic
dependence of Central Asian states on remittances
from Russia. Central Asian states view this risk seriously
and understand the vitality of taking steps towards
diversifying external migration locations. In response to
geopolitical shifts, Central Asian states are adopting
more cohesive migration policies compared to the past.
This article attempts to analyze the ongoing labor
migration trends and policies in Central Asia over the
past few years by mostly focusing on Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan since these
countries export the most labor to Russia. They will be
analyzed separately in accordance with the scope of
the new migration policies being introduced.
MAIN PART
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan has seriously taken up the issue of
regulating the processes of external labor migration:
the state is fighting illegal labor migration, creating
conditions for organized employment of citizens
abroad and reintegrating former labor migrants after
returning home.
The Main Directorate for Migration and Citizenship
(MDMC) of Uzbekistan is under the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and is a state div responsible for enacting
immigration policy in the country and ensuring the
implementation of immigration rules. The Ministry of
Employment and Poverty Reduction (MEPR) is in
charge of the effective implementation of labor
migration policy through the Agency for Migration
under the MEPR. The Institute for Labour Market
Research under the MEPR conducts scientific research
and surveys on employment, migration processes and
labor relations issues. The agency maintains records of
citizens who have left for temporary labor activity
abroad th
rough the migration platform “Xorijda Ish”
(Job Abroad). It licenses private employment agencies
for the employment of persons seeking work outside
the Republic of Uzbekistan, controls compliance with
licensing requirements and conditions, develops and
implements international projects in the field of
migration, interacts with the competent authorities of
foreign states on issues of temporary employment of
citizens abroad and ensures their labor rights. It does
so through its overseas representative offices in the
Russian Federation, the Republic of Korea, Türkiye,
Kazakhstan and Japan. Moreover, a Migration Fund has
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been established within the agency, from which
microloans of up to 10 million UZS can be provided to
labor migrants.
Several core legal documents, which regulate external
labor migration activities, were adopted since the start
of the Presidency of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, including but
not limited to:
−
Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Private
Employment Agencies, dated October 16, 2018;
−
Presidential Decree No. PP
‑
3839
“
On additional
measures to further improve the system of
external labor migration
”
, dated July 5, 2018;
−
Presidential
Decree
No.
UP
‑
4829
“
On
strengthening guarantees for Uzbek citizens
working temporarily abroad
”
, dated August 20,
2019;
−
Presidential Decree
“
On measures to introduce a
system of safe, orderly and legal labor migration
”
,
dated September 15, 2020;
−
Decree No. UP
‑
59
“
On additional measures to
improve labor migration and support for persons
temporarily working abroad
”
, dated April 4, 2024.
The legislations are directed at better organizing the
process of external labor migration of citizens through
controlling activities of employment agencies,
introducing vocational and language programs and
providing those who return home with employment
opportunities.
Bilateral labor agreements are being signed on a
regular basis, as reflected in the news. Even more
intergovernmental agreements are being discussed
and prepared with foreign partners, including Serbia
and Poland. Visa processes are also being simplified for
workers by countries such as the Republic of Korea.
Private foreign partners are also a part of the
discussion. According to the Migration Agency’s deputy
director Azimjon Khusanov, negotiations were held in
2024 with 240 major employers from 36 countries,
leading to cooperation agreements with 122 of them.
The number of potential employers and recruitment
agencies collaborating with the agency has reached
384. Additionally, Uzbekistan has partnered up with the
International Center for Migration Policy Development
(ICMPD). An opening of a joint Migrant Resource
Centre (MRC) of ICMPD in Tashkent is planned for 2025.
These policies have led to noticeable differences in
labor immigration statistics. A sharp drop in the
number of Uzbek migrants in Russia was observed from
1.2 million (2023) to 698 thousand (2024), a decline by
more than 40%. The United Kingdom allocated more
quotas for Uzbek citizens for the Seasonal Worker
Scheme (SWS). If only 556 seasonal work visas were
issued for Uzbeks in 2021, this number grew to 4,094 in
2023, 7.4 times increase. Regarding organized labor
recruitment to work abroad, the numbers provided by
the Migration Agency show a sharp increase in 2024. In
the same year, the Agency for the first time conducted
organized labor recruitment to Croatia, Belgium,
Slovakia, Serbia, Montenegro and Qatar, employing a
total of 10,000 Uzbekistan nationals in these countries.
In 2024, the number of Uzbek residents in South Korea
approached 95,000, while the issuance of seasonal
work visas to the UK increased 7.4 times between 2021
and 2023. In recent years, migration to European Union
countries has grown substantially, particularly to
Poland (which accounted for 21% of EU-issued visas),
Lithuania (17%), Germany (16%), and Latvia (7%). The
demand for seasonal workers in the United Kingdom
remains strong. Uzbek citizens accounted for
approximately 13% of all seasonal visas issued. For
reference, the UK issued 556 visas to Uzbek citizens in
2021, 4,228 in 2022, and 4,094 in 2023.
Kyrgyzstan
Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Migration of the
Kyrgyz Republic is the primary government organ
responsible for the regulation of migration flows and
policies in the country.
In Kyrgyzstan, a Center for Employment of Citizens
Abroad under the Ministry of Labour, Social Security
and Migration was established in 2021. The center
provides legal migration services to the Russian
Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the UK, the Republic
of Korea, Türkiye, Germany, Poland, Egypt, Slovakia,
Latvia, Japan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the United
Arab Emirates and more. Kyrgyzstan has signed labor
migration agreements with 21 countries (2024) and is
actively seeking to expand cooperation with other
countries in this area. The center also provides a list and
collaborates with private recruitment agencies, which
were licensed the Ministry of Labour, Social Security
and Migration of the Kyrgyz Republic. An online service
for entry ban verification to Russia (“Black List”) is also
available on the website of the Center of Employment.
It also provides compensation for the families of
migrants who died abroad by giving financial support
for the repatriation of bodies under the “Cargo 200”
service.
Notable legislations that regulate migration in
Kyrgyzstan include:
−
A presidential decree
“
On the adoption of
measures aimed at improving the migration
situation
”
from January 29, 2021;
−
Law of the Kyrgyz Republic
“
On External Labor
Migration
”
;
−
Law of the Kyrgyz Republic
“
On External
Migration
”
;
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−
Law of the Kyrgyz Republic
“
On the Fundamentals
of State Policy to Support Compatriots Abroad
”
;
Additionally, the Concept of Migration Policy 2021
–
2030 of the Kyrgyz Republic was adopted on May 4,
2021. The concept outlines four main tasks:
1.
Improving the conditions of educational, labor,
professional and cultural potential and opportunities in
the Kyrgyz Republic;
2.
Using the migration potential of the
population;
3.
Creating a system for protecting the rights of
citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic located outside the
country;
4.
Creating a safe migration environment.
In 2024, Kyrgyzstan joined the Global Compact for
Migration. ICMPD also operates an MRC in Osh,
Kyrgyzstan. On 5 March 2024, the International Centre
for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) officially
launched
the
project
“Improving
Migration
Management in Selected Silk Routes and Central Asian
Countries”. The project is sponsored by the European
Union and is implemented in partnership with the
Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Migration.
Forum Mekendeshter serves as a platform for dialogue
between members of the Kyrgyz diaspora living abroad.
The Forum was created by the “Rosa Otunbayeva
Initiative” International Public Foundation with the
support of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, the
International Organization of Migration in the Kyrgyz
Republic, and funded by a grant from the Swiss Bureau
on international cooperation. Under the Forum’s
framework, a Council on relations with compatriots
living abroad under the President of the Republic of
Kyrgyzstan operates.
Shifts in policies are leading to noticeable differences in
external labor migration patterns of Kyrgyz citizens.
More than 20,000 citizens of Kyrgyzstan officially found
jobs abroad in 2024. According to him, with the support
of the center, more than 4,000 citizens were employed,
including 3,800 in the United Kingdom and over 400 in
South Korea. Additionally, private employment
agencies helped in the employment of more than
16,000 people. The main destinations are Turkey,
Bulgaria, Hungary, and the United Kingdom. If
Lithuania welcomed 2 thousand workers from
Kyrgyzstan in 2023, in 2024, this number sharply
increased to 6 thousand. In Bulgaria, there were more
than 2 thousand people from Kyrgyzstan. The quota for
working in South Korea was increased to 3 thousand in
2024.
According to official data from the Ministry of Labor,
Social Development and Migration of the Kyrgyz
Republic, 650 thousand citizens of Kyrgyzstan are in
external migration. These statistics show that the influx
of migrants is decreasing every year. For example, last
year, 932 thousand people were officially registered as
being in labor migration. Among the CIS countries, it is
in Russia that a large number of migrants from the
Kyrgyz Republic are registered. Today, according to
official data, 350 thousand migrants work in the
Russian Federation. Kyrgyzstan being a part of the
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) eases the process of
migration for its workers. The EEU provided legalized
forms of labor migration for Kyrgyzstan’s wor
kers,
easing the opportunities to find work in Russia and
send remittances to family at home. This labor mobility
has been a relative success story of the Union.
However, recently there has been a trend when
Kyrgyzstanis who are in labor migration in Russia have
begun to leave for European countries. Deputy Minister
of Labor, Social Development and Migration of the
Kyrgyz Republic Bakyt Darmankul uulu told Kabar that
this is primarily due to the tightening of Russian
migration legislation after the terrorist attack at Crocus
City Hall and high wages in other countries. In 2024,
more than 10,000 Kyrgyzstanis work in Austria, and in
the UAE, in recent years, the number of migrants from
Kyrgyzstan has amounted to more than 11,000 people.
According to the latest data, there are more than
36,000 Kyrgyzstanis in the United States, about 61,000
in Turkey. Also, about 5,000 Kyrgyzstanis are in
migration in Italy.
Tajikistan
Tajikistan is the poorest country in Central Asia and half
its gross domestic product (GDP) comes from
remittances sent by relatives abroad. Surveys indicate
that 30 to 40 per cent of households in Tajikistan have
at least one member working abroad. Only a handful of
other countries have a greater reliance on remittances
than Tajikistan. Migrants
have become the country’s
prime export and the single largest source of income.
Following the deadly Crocus City Hall attack, Tajik
migrants became the most targeted in Russia. In the
first half of 2024, more than 3,000 Tajik migrants were
deported from Russia.
Tajikistan has the lowest wages among the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries,
with an average monthly salary almost eleven times
lower than that in the Russian Federation, which is why
the Russian labor market is attractive to migrant
workers from Tajikistan.
The Ministry of Labour, Migration and Employment of
Population of the Republic of Tajikistan is the central
government div designated to oversee migration and
create regulatory policies and legislation. The
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Migration Service under the Ministry serves as an
executive organ of the Ministry for migration. It is
responsible for various migration-related issues, such
as preventing irregular migration, monitoring
immigration levels, issuing work permits to migrants
and stateless persons, and monitoring compliance with
immigration legislation. Its responsibilities further
include coordinating with Tajik diplomatic missions
abroad and diaspora communities and organizations. A
Commission between ministries for Regulating
Migration Processes gives recommendations on
migration-related issues from across the government
ministries. The Inter-ministerial Commission meets at
least twice a year to develop semi-annual workplans
and allocate tasks for each ministry. Each ministry also
reports its accomplishments on agreed plans and tasks
to the Commission during the subsequent meetings.
State Agency for Employment Abroad under the
Ministry organizes migration to partner states,
negotiates and signs agreements with foreign
companies willing to hire Tajik workers. It also provides
opportunities and services for placement abroad.
Training of professionals is also a point of the migration
policy agenda. The state-administered Adult Education
Center of Tajikistan offers training in more than 100
professions, with new specializations emerging every
year.
Although the country is the most dependent on its
external migrants, its laws regulating the process of
migration are quite outdated. The concept of the State
Migration Policy of the Republic of Tajikistan (1998) set
the groundwork for Tajikistan’s migration governance.
The primary legal document is the Law “On Migration”
of the Republic of Tajikistan from 1999 (with later
amendments).
The Resolution of the Government of the Republic of
Tajikistan dat
ed June 30, 2023, No. 309 “Strategy for
regulating migration processes in the Republic of
Tajikistan for the period up to 2040” was adopted and
approved in 2023.
The strategy is an important socio-economic step for
Tajikistan and was developed to achieve the goals of
the National Development Strategy for the period up to
2030 in the direction of migration, taking into account
today’s migration conditions, positive trends in
sustainability, alternative development, prospects and
socio-economic policy of the republic. The strategy is
implemented in six stages and for the first time within
the framework of a single strategy for regulating the
process of all types of population migration (labor
migration, external migration, internal migration,
environmental migration, refugees and asylum
seekers). The strategy defines goals and objectives,
analysis of the current situation, problems, indicators,
main
directions
and
mechanisms
for
the
implementation of the State Migration Policy of
Tajikistan.
Some noticeable progress has been made in migration
outflows in recent years. A total of 41 international
legal acts were signed regarding the labor and
migration context in 2024 with 15 countries, including
the Russian Federation, Republic of Belarus,
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,
Islamic Republic of Iran, Türkiye, India, Qatar, Kuwait,
the United Arab Emirates, China, Japan and the
Republic of Korea. Of these, 13 were inter-
governmental agreements and 28 were inter-agency
agreements. Furthermore, 12 agreements aimed at
establishing a legal framework and strengthening
bilateral relationships on labor migration were
introduced with the Russian Federation, Republic of
Tatarstan (federal subject of Russian Federation),
Georgia, Poland, Serbia, Belgium, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Republic of
Korea, Japan, Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Of these,
four agreements were signed in 2024.
Although there is identifiable progress, its level remains
low. Official data show that 9,478 Tajik citizens found
employment through 29 licensed organizations in the
first half of 2025. Of those, 5,648 were assisted by the
State Employment Agency. Despite appearing
significant, these numbers represent only a fraction of
the working-age population seeking jobs abroad. South
Korea, for example, allocated 800 worker quotas for
Tajikistan in 2025. Yet only 26 of 35 citizens trained
under the Employment Permit System (EPS) passed the
required exam. A new group is now in training for the
next selection phase. Japan also ranks as a priority
destination, but the volume remains low. Of 68
registered candidates, four have begun working, and
eight have passed intervie
ws, underscoring Japan’s
high entry standards and limited intake.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan, along with Russia, is the biggest host of
Central Asian migrant workers. In 2024, Uzbekistan
became the second biggest exporter of labor to
Kazakhstan. However, as the number of labor migrants
opting to go to Russia continues to fall, Kazakhstan is
becoming a growing destination for Central Asian
workers. As in Russia, the Kazakh economy suffers from
a shortage of labor. Because of the oil-driven economic
boom during the last decade, Kazakhstan has an
increasing demand for both high-skilled labor in
industry, business, and education, and low-skilled labor
in agriculture, bazaars, and the construction sector.
Unlike the Russian government, however, the Kazakh
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government has taken a more accommodating stance
toward labor migrants, resulting in increased numbers
of Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tajik workers in the country over
the last few years.
Based on the data from the Migration Agency of
Uzbekistan, there were 322.7 thousand Uzbek workers
in the northern neighbor at the beginning of 2025. This
was the second biggest destination for migrants from
Uzbekistan after Russia. The same applies to
Kyrgyzstan. In 2024, there were roughly 70,000 Kyrgyz
labor migrants in Kazakhstan according to the IOM
Migration situation report for January-December 2024.
For Tajikistan, in terms of labor export, Kazakhstan was
also in top 2, with 6,534 migrants working there in the
second half of 2024, according to the IOM migration
situation report for July-December 2024.
On the other hand, external labor migration from
Kazakhstan is modest and declining. Remittances only
account for 0.1% of the country’s overall GDP.
The primary government organ that oversees migration
policy is the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of
the Population of Kazakhstan, while the main piece of
legislation is the Law “On Migration” (2011, No. 477
-IV,
with amendments through 2024), which governs all
types of migration. In 2023, the Kazakh government
also passed the Migration Policy Concept for 2023-
2027.
According to the data from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 137 thousand Kazakh citizens are abroad for
employment purposes in 2024. The largest share lives
in the Russian Federation, the Republic of Korea,
Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates; others choose
such countries as the United Kingdom or Poland.
In 2024, the number of arrivals in the country
amounted to 29,282 people, and the number of
departures from the country was 12,732 people. The
net migration amounted to 16,550 people. Compared
to 2023, the number of arrivals in Kazakhstan increased
by 15.3%, while the number of departures from
Kazakhstan decreased by 20.9%. The main migration
exchange of the country takes place with the CIS
countries. The share of arrivals from the CIS countries
was 81.6%, the share of departures to these countries
was 74.8%. A record low number of people left
Kazakhstan for a permanent residence abroad in 2024
since the country’s independence.
Turkmenistan
While this analysis focuses more on Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, it is pertinent to
briefly examine Turkmenistan’s labor migration
situation.
The Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of
Population and the State Migration Service of
Turkmenistan are the responsible bodies for migration
policy. Main legislative documents include the
Migration Law of 2012, the Law on Migration Service of
2009 and the Law on the Employment of the Population
of 2016.
Authoritative datasets on labor migrants are thin or
absent for Turkmenistan. The limited availability of
data makes it hard to produce a proper analysis. Since
Ashgabat discloses little to no migration data, most
studies rely on host-country statistics and reports of
international organizations. According to UN DESA
migrant-stock estimates, in 2020, 242,554 people from
Turkmenistan lived in other countries, which
represents 4.1% of Turkmenistan’s population.
Whereas in other Central Asian countries, Russia plays
a fundamental role as a destination country for labor
migration, in Turkmenistan, Turkey is the most popular
destination. This is due to the linguistic affinity
between these two countries, as their languages
belong to the same linguistic group. The next most
popular destinations are Iran and the Persian Gulf
countries, such as the Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia,
in light of their geographic location. Labour migration is
the result of a prolonged economic crisis that has
forced people to leave the country in search of work
elsewhere. Many of the Turkmen who migrate for work
go to Turkey. However, in 2022, at Ashgabat’s request,
Turkey canceled its visa-free regime for Turkmen, and
the following year, Ankara tightened rules covering
Turkmen migrants. Since then, the number of Turkmen
migrants in Türkiye has been steadily decreasing,
reaching around 112,000 in mid-2024.
The increasingly tough conditions for Turkmen
nationals in Turkey have heightened Uzbekistan’s and
Belarus’ attractiveness as labor
-migration destinations.
Between January and October of 2024, Turkmen made
up two-thirds of those traveling to Uzbekistan for
commerce and trade, with about 89,000 Turkmen
visiting over that period. In 2024, 16,300 Turkmen
entered Belarus, in large part thanks to migration
reforms the country undertook in 2023 that made it
easier for foreign workers to obtain legal status.
Moreover, in recent years, Turkmenistan has ceased to
renew expired, expiring, or invalid passports or replace
lost ones for its citizens living abroad via diplomatic
missions in an attempt to compel Turkmens abroad to
return to their home country. The situation has been
condemned by the Human Rights Watch through a
report titled ““It’s Like I Live in a Cage”: Turkmen
Authorities’ Denial of Passports to Turkmen Citizens in
Türkiye”.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
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International Journal Of History And Political Sciences (ISSN
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The current population of Central Asia is 83,739,349 as
of August 11, 2025. On top of that, Central Asia is
experiencing a significant demographic growth.
Population growth for 2024 was 1.3% for Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan
–
1.7%, Tajikistan
–
1.9%, Turkmenistan
–
1.8%, Uzbekistan
–
2.0%. With such numbers, the
governments of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan,
in particular, are finding it hard to accommodate the
needs of their excess labor force. The process has to be
met with proper levels of job creation. In the
meantime, sending workers abroad is a good resolution
since it benefits the country’s economy, lifts some
weight off the domestic job market and brings back
more skilled workers.
Workers have sought jobs abroad largely through
private recruitment agencies for the longest time. As a
result, misinformation has been widespread, as the
government has yet to provide credible and consistent
information on recruitment processes abroad.
Brain drain is another important aspect of labor
migration to consider. The impact of the outflow of
students, scientists, and other scholars is increasingly
worrying the region’s governments. These countries
are already suffering losses because of the departure of
students, scientists, and other scholars, and fear that
without such people, their countries’ development will
be hobbled. All five countries are committed to
addressing this problem. All invest far less in education
and research, however, than the average of the world’s
countries, most by more than an order of magnitude.
Money shortages have limited their ability to hold, let
alone attract back. Kazakhstan, in particular,
experiences a pronounced “brain drain” across various
industries.
The region’s governments are gradually starting to
deepen their involvement in migration processes and
are facing similar challenges. Some significant progress
has been achieved, but the processes are not without
shortcomings. Based on its findings, the paper
proposes the following recommendations:
−
Offering comprehensive guidance to migrants on
critical topics such as contract terms, workplace
safety, emergency communication channels to
avoid exploitation and poor working conditions.
Cases of labor abuse, contract violations, and even
homelessness have been reported even in Europe
with Tajik migrants in Lithuania. This led to
Lithuania closing its visa center in Dushanbe in July
2025.
−
Expanding bilateral agreements,
especially with the
countries of Europe, which have high demands for
labor given the low birth rate, especially in sectors
like agriculture, construction and more.
−
Strengthening diplomatic efforts to improve
working conditions and combat discrimination by
offering free legal consultations through foreign
missions, not only in home countries.
−
Expanding foreign language courses and training in
in-demand professions. South
Korea’s Employment
Permit System (EPS), through which the country
hosts Central Asian migrants, has a language test
requirement
–
EPS-TOPIK. The language barrier is
preventing many from leaving to higher-income
countries such as the Republic of Korea.
−
Establishing mutual recognition of qualifications
and simplification of the procedure for validation of
diplomas for employment abroad.
−
Combatting illegal labor migration. Systemic
misconduct within the recruitment industry often
creates the conditions for, or directly causes, many
of the abuses that migrant workers suffer. Existing
licensing schemes for private employment
agencies should be improved and strengthened.
−
Establishing better programs of reintegration for
returning migrants.
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan share the challenge of insufficient
reintegration support for returnees seeking to
translate
their
overseas
experience
into
meaningful employment opportunities at home.
−
Strengthening the process of producing timely and
accurate data on migration stocks and flows;
increasing their availability and accessibility.
Addressing bottlenecks in domestic labor markets can
increase the attractiveness of home economies,
reducing the push and pull factors to emigrate. Overall,
policies that can help make the domestic labor market
more attractive and efficient. Job creation, social
protection, unemployment and poverty reduction
should be domestic priorities. These will lessen the
need for seeking jobs abroad and reduce the reliance
on remittances. More broadly, the low quality of life,
one of the main factors for seeking work abroad, should
also not be neglected and should be addressed more
properly through long-term policies and strategies.
CONCLUSION
Central Asian economies need to shift away from the
current dependence on labor migrants in the Russian
Federation, especially Tajikistan. The instability of the
Russian ruble as a consequence of economic sanctions
following the invasion of Ukraine has impacted the
remittance values and even occasionally strained some
regional currencies such as the Kazakh tenge.
The regional governments closely monitor the possible
economic risks and the fragile situation regarding the
legal status of their labor migrants in Russia. Recent
developments demonstrate the firm commitment of
International Journal Of History And Political Sciences
21
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International Journal Of History And Political Sciences (ISSN
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2771-2222)
Central Asian countries to diversify the sources of
remittances and reduce their dependence on Russia.
The region needs to strike a balance between searching
for more opportunities abroad and maintaining good
diplomatic relations with Moscow through their multi-
vector foreign policy. Proper labor diplomacy with
partner countries could turn this economic weakness
into an advantage.
While Russia still remains the biggest host of labor
migrants from Central Asia, just a few years ago it
would have been impossible to imagine hundreds of
thousands of Central Asians seeking work in Asia, or
tens of thousands going to Europe. Central Asia needs
to continue working on the competitiveness of its
workforce through professional trainings and
government programs. The region is on the right track.
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